Anubis
Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operation · Financial — ransomware and regulatory-pressure extortion
Tactics, Techniques & Procedures (TTPs)
- Regulatory-notification extortion: reported to threaten notification of HIPAA OCR (US), ICO (UK) and other national regulators if the ransom is not paid (single-vendor reporting; not described in UltraViolet Cyber's advisory)
- Data-theft-only affiliate tier: exfiltration without encryption; Barracuda reports an 80/20 split for RaaS, 60% to the affiliate for data extortion and 50% for access brokers
- Encryptor uses ECIES per UltraViolet Cyber and Barracuda; the site's earlier AES-256-CTR/RSA-4096 claim has no source and was removed
- Wiper mode via the /WIPEMODE parameter zero-byte-overwrites files, alongside /KEY= and /elevated; uses vssadmin and raw \\.\PHYSICALDRIVE0 access; ransom note RESTORE FILES.html, extension .anubis
- Initial access reported via RDP exploitation, credential stuffing and trojanized installers (Barracuda)
- Tor-based leak site with staged victim listing
- Rules reportedly bar attacks on former Soviet states (Barracuda)
Known Targets
Analyst Notes
Anubis surfaced in December 2024 per UltraViolet Cyber and Barracuda (this site previously said November 2024), after a precursor test build named Sphinx. Barracuda states it is unrelated to the Android banker, FIN7's Anubis backdoor or BlackCat's "Sphynx". The July 2026 Fairlife incident is the most prominent confirmed victim; most other victim counts come from leak-site claims and are unverified. The earlier profile's encryption scheme and tooling claims (AES-256-CTR/RSA-4096, Fortinet/Ivanti/Cisco ASA exploitation, BloodHound, Rclone) were not found in the sources checked and were removed. Standard ransomware IR is insufficient where regulatory pressure is threatened: legal counsel should assess notification obligations independently of payment decisions.
Also Known As
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques