APT36
Pakistan — attribution to APT36/Transparent Tribe assessed with moderate confidence by Acronis TRU, based on targeting geography, malware construction, and infrastructure reuse (this specific PATCHCORD campaign is not confirmed attribution beyond moderate confidence) · Espionage / intelligence collection, with strategic interest in Afghan telecom metadata visibility and continued focus on Indian government/military/diplomatic targets
Tactics, Techniques & Procedures (TTPs)
- Sector-tailored lures: ZIP archive ('Telecom_TMS.zip') containing an Inno Setup installer ('TMS_AfghanTelecom.exe') disguised as Afghan Telecom's internal Transport Management System tool
- Fake VPN installers impersonating AFTEL, the Afghan national telecom provider
- PATCHCORD: compiled C/C++ backdoor for persistent access, command execution, and file transfer, beaconing to hardcoded C2 at 46.30.188[.]13
- SHEETCORD: uses Google Sheets as a C2 channel (commands pushed as spreadsheet entries, results retrieved via the same API) to blend with legitimate enterprise traffic
- HACKERAI C2 Agent: routes C2 through GitHub Gists as a redundant trusted-platform channel
Known Targets
Analyst Notes
Acronis TRU research documents a previously undisclosed three-malware cluster — PATCHCORD, SHEETCORD, and the GitHub-based 'HACKERAI' C2 agent — all operating from shared infrastructure, active since at least March 2026. Notable strategic shift: primary targeting of Afghan national telecom (rather than APT36's historically India-centric focus), consistent with Pakistani intelligence interest in Afghan communications infrastructure.
Also Known As