Weaver Ant
China-nexus (Sygnia). Attribution rests on GMT+8 working-day activity, China Chopper use, the ORB network and a backdoor overlap with reported Chinese APT activity; Sygnia says a false flag cannot be ruled out · Telecommunications infrastructure espionage / signals intelligence collection / long-duration persistent access
Tactics, Techniques & Procedures (TTPs)
- Initial access via compromised externally facing servers (T1190), per Sygnia; not via the Zyxel routers
- China Chopper variants in ASPX, PHP and VB using AES, with parameters named "password", "key" and "pass" to evade WAF logging
- INMemory: loads a GZipped, Base64 eval.dll into memory and runs payloads via JScript, leaving no on-disk artefact
- ReGeorg-style recursive HTTP tunnelling and web shells chained across hosts for lateral movement
- Operational relay network using Zyxel CPE routers (mostly firmware VMG3625-T20A) run by Southeast Asian telcos, pivoting from one telco's device to target another
- Defence evasion: patched ETW, overwrote AmsiScanBuffer in amsi.dll, loaded PowerShell through System.Management.Automation.dll without powershell.exe
- Tooling includes Invoke-SMBClient (NTLM hashes), Invoke-SharpView (AD reconnaissance) and Invoke-ZIP (staging)
- Persistent re-access after remediation across a four-plus year engagement
Known Targets
Analyst Notes
Exposed by Sygnia on 24 March 2025 after an incident response engagement at an Asian telecommunications provider. Some press suggests it may operate alongside Velvet Ant and Salt Typhoon; Sygnia is tentative and the names are not merged here. CORRECTED to match Sygnia's ATT&CK mapping: T1055 and T1041 were removed (Sygnia lists T1048 for exfiltration) and Proxy is T1090.001 (Internal Proxy). No 2026 reporting found; Singapore's IMDA published an advisory on the activity (not reviewed).
Also Known As
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques